U.S. Government Makes Uncharacteristically Great Decision, Spends Decade Trying to Undo It

Bloomberg – Too Big to Fix: Fannie and Freddie Are Still a Mess

I never pass up an article about mortgage markets, so once I saw Bloomberg offering their opinion on why Fannie and Freddie are “still a mess” ten years into conservatorship, I was in from the jump.

Outside of the economic and reputational damage it caused, I’m a big fan of the Financial Crisis, even the fact that we call it “The Financial Crisis” – like there never was or never will be another one. I’m a big finance guy and even bigger policy wonk, so the storylines that emerged out of that period are right up my alley. Most have played out in full and been relegated to the dustbin of history, becoming more folklore nowadays than relevant discussions. There is one that remains, though: the re-privatization of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

Fannie and Freddie are known as Government-sponsored Enterprises (GSEs). They’re private companies that were basically granted monopoly status by the U.S. government in order to keep the mortgage markets functioning smoothly and encourage home ownership. They each have lines of credit with the Treasury Department, are exempt from state and local taxes and, despite being publicly-traded, they’re not regulated by the SEC. Their business models consist of buying private label mortgages, securitizing them and then guaranteeing the mortgages to ensure that interest and principal payments are made on the subsequent mortgage bonds.

The two companies got into a whole heap of trouble in 2008 when the subprime market began to implode and those guarantees became problematic. Long story short: the feds stepped in and the two companies were taken over by the government. In return for the bail out, the Treasury received $1B in preferred stock with a 10% coupon from each entity, as well as warrants for 79.9% of each of their the common stock.

The idea at the time was to bail these two private companies out, stabilize the mortgage markets and then return them back to shareholders at a profit for the taxpayers a la the AIG bailout. However, ten years into the bailout and the government is not one step closer to figuring out what the future will look like for the companies. The problem is two-fold here and, surprisingly, has nothing to do with partisan politics. The first issue is that the two entities are so massive, so integral to the U.S. economy, that any sweeping changes would require years of heavy lifting and, with the stakes so high, nobody has tried in earnest to restructure the companies and return them to private investors. The second issue is that well, the current structure is… working? We’re ten years into this relationship and so far, so good. The mortgage markets are running as smoothly as ever, Fannie and Freddie have returned to profitability and the Treasury is clipping a 10% coupon on its preferred interests. Not to mention, the Treasury mandated that any profit Fannie or Freddie generate be remitted to taxpayers in the form of dividend distributions as well. If you need a summary: the bail out worked and the taxpayers are making a killing. Status quo is always good for governments and this situation is no different – if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.

Unsurprisingly, not everyone feels that way. Some big name funds like Paulson & Co. and Fairholme have taken large stakes in the companies’ remaining public equity and have preached, quite loudly, that the companies should be returned to private investors and that they’d be able to were the Treasury not siphoning their profits each quarter. On the other hand, you have some politicians that believe the mortgage markets should be a private capital game or that the current situation is an unsustainable band-aid fix.

To these parties I ask: why? For what reason is the current situation unsustainable? Why is it imperative that Fannie and Freddie regain their status as private companies? Forget the fact that Fannie and Freddie were never truly private – any company with tax exempt status and a revolver with the Treasury is far from private. The fact is that homeowners are able to take out reasonably priced mortgages from private companies, bond investors are getting their low risk yield and the taxpayers are making money. The system works! “But it’s a band-aid fix! It was never meant to be this way!” True, very true. You know what else is true though? Every day the government doesn’t do anything to amend the current structure is a day the band-aid fix becomes a little more permanent. Slowly and slowly, as new and old elected officials move in and out of Washington, each Congress becomes a little more detached from the whole thing and will elect to do nothing – as long as everything is functioning as it should.

If you take a step back and actually look at how the system is working now, it seems like this is how it was always supposed to be. Private companies are investing in the mortgage market, consumers are buying homes, taxpayers are generating a profit and the government has a policy tool in Fannie and Freddie. Don’t get me wrong, that was not by design. It was a happy accident that the feds stepped in for a decade and have been successfully running the largest financial services companies on the planet. Let’s not screw this up.

 

 

Fortress Doesn’t Believe in (Possibly Care About) Conflict Checks

“NY Post – SoftBank’s Fortress Investment Group is raising a $400 million fund to sue tech companies over intellectual property infringement…”

Before we get started, I know that Mike Novogratz left his life’s work years ago, but who else am I going to put up there to represent Fortress?

Now, I have to admit I was ready to poke some fun at SoftBank for this one. How can a conglomerate, with telecom, semiconductor and robotics interests allow one of its portfolio companies to be an outright patent troll? How can SoftBank, who has $195B in committed capital for it’s tech-focused investment vehicles, allow Fortress (“FIG”) to shakedown the very companies in which they seek to invest? Well after a while, it hit me: whether purposeful or not, this is probably a great way to hedge a tech-centric private equity portfolio. Outside of proper due diligence, managing FX / rates exposure or structuring capital calls to meet specific milestones, there aren’t many ways to manage the downside risk of making poor investments in the first place – especially when deploying capital into intellectual property-heavy tech industry.

Odds are, you’re investing in a tech company because it claims to have a new technology that can streamline business processes, enhance end-user experiences or is simply a brand new class of product. With new technology comes the prospect of a high adoption rate and, of course, multiples of invested capital. It’s not all glitz and glamour though, and there are real risks to investing in the tech space, more so perhaps than any other industry. The costliest mistake you can make in tech investing is, by a wide margin, not conducting the proper diligence around a target’s intellectual property / patent portfolio. Does the company really own this IP? Are they infringing on someone else’s IP? Who’s line of code is this, truly? Are there any outstanding lawsuits? What about imminent filings? Tons of these lawsuits are filed every day around the world by what are known as “patent trolls” – individuals or funds that buy random portfolios of IP and lawyer up to shakedown other tech companies for infringement. Rarely do the lawsuits reach a decision as they’re usually settled outside of court, which is exactly what the patent troll wanted. It’s a pretty scummy industry, but it’s also pretty lucrative – which is why FIG wants a piece of it. If a respected NYC asset manager raises $400M with the intention of suing nerdy Silicon Valley idealists into oblivion, the nerds will pay up to settle. Cash burn is fine when it serves whatever “mission” the unicorn de jour says it has, not when it’s being wasted on lawyers.

That brings us to the impact of this new FIG vehicle on its parent, SoftBank. Taken at face value, it seems like FIG is raising two birds toward everything SoftBank has built it’s reputation on – investing in and building out new technologies. If you take a forest vs. tree view, though, a successful patent troll investment platform can hedge against IP-related losses SoftBank portfolio companies may incur. Obviously a $400M investment is an irrelevant hedge for a $195B portfolio, but it’s a start. It’s not unthinkable that were this initial foray to be successful, that FIG would double or triple down to target more or larger targets. I also wouldn’t discount the idea of SoftBank seeding a larger IP strategy within FIG were they to succeed with this initial vehicle – that would be something special. This will be an interesting story to follow in the next few years and, no matter what happens, it’ll be a great exercise in thinking outside of the risk management box for SoftBank.

CEO Invests in Local Bodegas (Plus Blog Update)

First things first: I’ve taken a bit of a hiatus recently and haven’t posted anything for the last six days. I’ve been pretty busy with work, not to mention the IT nerds at my firm decided to block my own domain. I’m working with them now to get it sorted out but, until then, we’ll be doing limited posts from my phone or during the evening.

Now that we have that out of the way, lets take a second to bask in the glory that is Kam Wong, CEO of Municipal Credit Union (MCU), who has no grasp on how to commit bank fraud or what to do with the ill-gotten gains:

“CNBC – The CEO of New York state’s oldest credit union swindled his institution for years out of millions of dollars and blew a whopping $3.55 million on lottery tickets, federal prosecutors charged Tuesday.

There are two main takeaways from this story. The first is that Kam Wong is either a woefully inept CEO, or he’s a woefully inept criminal – and I’m going with both here. Forget that he embezzled over $6M from his own company, the way he pulled it off is next level stupid. The guy was running your standard insurance fraud racket in order to collect cash on $6M worth of bogus dental and long term disability claims. So what did he do when he had the money – well, withdraw $1.9M from ATMs via 2,592 transactions and write over 200 checks to a bodega in Elmont, NY. You would think a banking CEO would be able to cook up a better way to embezzle and launder money than that.

The second takeaway and obviously the most important, is that Kam blew almost $4M of the money on…

Lotto tickets. You remember those bodega checks he was writing? Yeah, he wrote all of them to the bodega in order to feed his insatiable scratch off habit. Here’s The Post:

“In a weird twist, about $3.9 million of the ill-gotten gains allegedly went to fund a “lottery habit” near his office and his home in Valley Stream, Long Island.

Wong, who made more than $684,000 a year, wrote 216 checks to two bodegas and withdrew $1.9 million from ATMs a total of 2,592 times for the lottery tickets — sometimes multiple times a day, according to the complaint.

On weekends, Wong “spent hours … purchasing and playing lottery tickets,” according to the Justice Department complaint filed by Manhattan US attorney Geoffrey S.”

What a weird guy! I just can’t wrap my brain around buying $4M worth of lotto tickets. Did he play 200,000 twenty dollar games or 4,000,000 one dollar games? How much did he actually win on them? How upset is the bodega owner who just lost his $4M scratch off customer? Why did a CEO clearing almost $700K a year live in Valley Stream and hang out in Elmont? I doubt we’ll ever know the answers, but if you think I’ll ever stop searching for them, you’re probably right. I’ll definitely enjoy myself a nice chuckle when I see a headline buried in the “Local” section of the NY papers when he gets sentenced. That’s it, though.

But seriously, thoughts and prayers to the bodega. They’ll need to sling a whole lot of these bad boys to make up for the Kam Wong revenue shortfall going forward:

I Say We Bail Out the Hedge Funds, Too

“Bloomberg – At Milken, Hedge Fund Managers Swap Ideas on Staying in Business”

Won’t somebody please think of the fund managers!

I wanted to write a blog about how out of touch this group of millionaires is that they felt it necessary to take to a public forum to complain about how difficult it is for them to make money. Because when you’re blaming your own investors, stating their risk aversion has “sowed the seeds of very mediocre returns and high fees”, you’re not doing yourself any favors.

The truth is, though, they’re partially right. Now before we get into it, it’s important to understand that while the average American probably views fund managers as overpaid leaches, sucking economic value from the public system for their own private gain, they serve an important role in a modern economy. Traditionally, fund managers have offered three key benefits to investors and the market as a whole: (i) they assist institutional investors such as pension funds and insurance companies diversify their portfolios across different sectors and strategies, creating a more predictable return profile to match their long-term liabilities, (ii) they offer other sophisticated investors the opportunity to invest in more illiquid strategies like real estate, commodities and derivatives, and (iii) they provide liquidity to the broader market and enhance price discovery. Historically speaking, hedge funds have been pretty good at generating benchmark-beating, uncorrelated, risk-adjusted returns, and they collected fat fees for doing so. After all, investors were generally beating their benchmarks, even after the funds collected their fees, so nobody cared. Times are different now, though, and that’s where the plight of the hedge fund comes into play.

The rise of passive/index investing has been pretty detrimental to the traditional hedge fund model for a number of reasons, however it’s not just the strategy itself, but the time in which it came to prominence which ended up being the perfect storm for hedge funds. According to EY, the ETF market increased from $700B under management in 2008 to over $4.5T at the end of 2017 – for the people at home, that’s an increase of 543%. What’s more, 2017 alone saw inflows of $464B into passive vehicles. The explosion in passive products and their AUM has either democratized or socialized the markets, depending on who you ask. Either way, they have given all investors the ability to target as broad or narrow an investment strategy as they like, from simply buying the S&P 500 or small cap energy stocks, to shorting the VIX and beyond. As more and more money flows into these products, the asset managers need to go out and buy more stocks to replicate the underlying indices, therefore inflating individual stock prices in the process.

This is the problem for hedge funds. We’ve been on an almost ten year tear after bottoming out in the financial crisis, with the S&P 500 up +259% over that period. When you combine such strong, broad market performance with the explosion in passive capital basically bidding up individual stocks on a daily basis, it is nearly impossible for traditional fund managers to generate any alpha – and ladies and gentleman, if there’s no alpha, there’s no fees to collect for the fund managers. As a result, you’ve seen many large investors wonder out loud why they’re paying fees to managers who can’t beat the market, which has led to an all-out exodus from the hedge fund model. Even behemoth pension funds such as CalPERS are ditching managers for the passive life. Doing away with fund managers in the name of saving money on fees may prove to be penny wise and pound foolish though, as any deep correction in the market would likely be amplified by the fact that so many investors have plowed money into these products. At the end of the day, these guys are called hedge funds. They aim to provide appropriate risk-adjusted (i.e., hedged) returns. If you’re just super long energy stocks through an ETF and there’s another 2015-2016 episode, you’ll wish you had paid some fees and been hedged through an experienced energy fund manager who would’ve had proper risk management systems in place to mitigate downside risk.

Regardless, at this moment the hedge fund model is broken and if they want to survive, they’ll need to adapt. I saw an interesting piece in Bloomberg the other day that encouraged managers to ditch 2/20 and actually pay all their LPs a guaranteed fixed rate over the benchmark returns to manage their assets. Anything generated over that fixed rate would remain with the fund manager. The investors would generate a guaranteed return, similar to a fixed income product, and the manager would retain any alpha generated. It’s an interesting idea, but not likely. It’s good to at least see people thinking outside of the box.

Here’s The Mooch Getting Spiritual After Missing Out on $100M Payday

Let me start out by saying my firm has blocked Leveraged Burnout on our network, so I’m blogging from my phone. Apologies if there are typos, rambling sentences or any weird formatting issues.

“Bloomberg – HNA Group Co. and SkyBridge Capital have agreed to drop the Chinese conglomerate’s plan to acquire the investment firm.

Anthony Scaramucci: everyone’s favorite hedge fund giant and real life short guy. There was a time when The Mooch had it all. After a bunch of fundraising for then-presidential candidate Trump, he was finally offered the position of White House Director of Communications after the Sean Spicer experiment.  As is normal for cabinet members, he began to divest of assets that could conflict with his duties as a cabinet member, in this case, his stake in the well known fund-of-funds he built, SkyBridge Capital (actually a solid shop, did business with them at one point). The deal was valued at $180M, which would net Scaramucci about $100M at closing.

Anyway, he oddly chose to sell the firm to HNA, a giant Chinese conglomerate, and subject the transaction to CFIUS (which is a council that decides to approve or deny material foreign investments into U.S. companies). This was pretty dumb because after all the Trump-China campaign rhetoric, The Mooch decided to sell out to the Chinese tax free in front of the whole world. Predictably, the whole thing became a drawn out mess because of how high profile the sale was. It also didn’t help that he told a reporter what he really thinks about Steve Bannon and Reince Priebus, leading to him being unceremoniously (but hilariously) fired after 10 days in office.

Welp, that all leads us to yesterday’s developments, where SkyBridge and HNA decided the CFIUS process was too laborious and expensive and moved to kill the deal. So now The Mooch is out $100M and will be returning to the firm he built, which I suppose isn’t the worst thing. Maybe he’ll do the right thing and give Gary Cohn a job, too.

P.S. – Tell me this guy’s tenure at the White House didn’t play out exactly like you thought it would.

Here’s A World I’m Not Ready to Live In…

“NY Post – Global wine output fell to its lowest level in 60 years in 2017 due to poor weather conditions in the European Union that slashed production in the bloc, an international wine organization said.

Sound the alarm, folks – we’ve got a crisis-a-brewin’!

According to a newly published report by the OIV on Wednesday, it looks like global wine production dropped -8.6% in 2017 to the lowest level since 1957. That’s 12 years before we even went to the moon, for some context. The culprit was poor growing conditions, more specifically, frost, in the “old world” stalwart regions of Italy, France and Spain. The good news here is that while production has plummeted to 250 hectoliters,  global consumption inched up only slightly to 243 hectoliters in 2017 (that’s about 33.25B bottles of production to satisfy 32.3B bottles of consumption). So like, should we be investing in wine then?

It’s hard to say, really, and it also depends on your risk appetite. The best benchmark to monitor price fluctuations in the secondary fine wine market is the Liv-Ex 100. It used to be free, but with success comes a paywall I suppose (check it on BBG if you have one: LIVX100). Anyway, prices have been relatively subdued in 2018, but that comes on the heels of a 31% run-up in the index since YE 2016. So it would appear that a lot of the impact of last year’s small yield is already baked into the market. That doesn’t mean there aren’t opportunities to make money, though.

Wine is becoming an increasingly, well… liquid asset. Aside from becoming the go to data source for wine markets, Liv-Ex also runs a secondary marketplace where participants all around the world buy and sell fine wine. This also consists of trade settlement / logistics operations which manage payment, delivery and storage in the Liv-Ex bonded warehouse. So if you think you’re able to day trade around the wine markets and make a profit, have at it (it obviously isn’t that liquid yet, so keep an eye out for those elusive arbitrage opportunities).

Outside of trading wine on your prop account, there are many private investment vehicles investing in all facets of the wine industry: real estate, rare wines, you name it. A lot of the managers take nuanced approaches that suit investor appetite, too, like equity vs. debt, or region-specific approaches.

So, there are mechanisms to profit in a market with increasing demand and waning supply, but you want to do it the right way in order to limit your downside. You want to play the macro trend here, especially if you’re going to lock up capital in a private vehicle for 5-10 years. Demographics are changing and with it, tastes in wines. Millennials are now drinking more wine than baby boomers, and it shows in not only sales but in varietal and regional preference as well. While Bordeaux, Piedmont and Burgundy are timeless, the younger crowd has really taken an affinity to new world wines out of Chile, California and Washington (no doubt a function of cheaper prices and increasing quality). Were supply imbalances in the global wine market to become a relatively normal occurrence, I fully expect the new world regions to pick up the slack both in production and, perhaps more importantly, agricultural and distribution technology. That’s where the money will be.

It was Inevitable…

As I speculated previously, Deutsche Bank is going to be firing a bunch at 60 Wall any moment. Per Bloomberg:

Deutsche Bank AG is abandoning its ambitions to be a top global securities firm as it embarks on possibly the most sweeping overhaul yet of its struggling investment bank.

Sheeeeesh. I suppose this is for the best, though, take a look at these highlights:

  • 1Q net revenue EU6.98 billion, down 5%; analyst estimate EU7.27 billion
  • 1Q sales and trading revenue EU2.45 billion, down 17% while U.S. counterparts rose 12%
  • 1Q net income attributable to shareholders EU120 million

Look at that last one! Ladies and gentlemen, €120M is NOT a lot of money.

Sewing knew coming into his new job that this had to be a “rip the band-aid off” type of restructuring and I commend him for wasting no time in getting down to business. They mentioned on the call that there would be a “significant reduction” in headcount this year, and they’re targeting U.S. rates S&T,  U.S. corporate finance and the coup de grâce, global cash equities trading. If you don’t make markets in rates and equities or advise companies on raising capital in the U.S., are you even really an investment bank? Maybe in practice you retain some IB capabilities, but people won’t be doing business with you in an IB capacity – which is fine. Sewing’s job, first and foremost,  is to make money, and he’s going to do it the only way he knows – traditional commercial and retail banking, with a sprinkle of asset management. So good luck to Sewing, and even more best wishes to all of the DB employees updating their resumes right now. Don’t cry because it’s over, smile because it happened.

Netflix Likes On-balance Sheet Debt, Too

“Bloomberg – The world’s largest online television network sold $1.9 billion of senior bonds in its largest-ever dollar-denominated offering

Here’s an unpopular opinion: Netflix really isn’t that great of a product – like, at all. I’ve always felt that their movie catalog was downright awful, filled to the brim with low-budget features that close to zero people have ever heard of. Their television and original series content definitely offers a better selection, but they’ve never been able to convince me to pony up cash on a monthly basis. Alas, the numbers don’t lie – Netflix continues to beat street estimates for new user growth quarter over quarter. So when they announce they’re issuing a bunch of high yield debt to finance new licensing acquisitions and original content production on the back of parabolic customer growth, it shouldn’t surprise anyone. But I’m a cynical numbers guy, so I’m here to poke some holes in everyone’s favorite stock (and one of my least favorite products).

The content industry is very fond of off-balance sheet transactions, and Netflix is no different. The transactions materialize in the form of commitments to purchase content from production houses (Disney, Warner Bros., NBCUniversal, etc.) in the future for a few billion dollars. This ensures that Netflix is able to provide newer content for its audience as tastes change. The weird thing here is how these transactions are accounted for. Netflix amortizes these costs, through COGS adjustments, across the shorter of (i) what they deem to be the length of time viewers will continue to stream that particular show/movie or (ii) ten years, starting on the date that the content becomes available for streaming. As of 12/31/2017, Netflix had amassed $17.7B in content acquisition liabilities, of which $10.2B never makes an appearance in their financial statements as the content isn’t yet available for streaming on the platform.

Once you adjust for the off-balance sheet obligations, Netflix’s total liabilities jump from $15.4B to $25.6B at YE 2017 and $27.5B after this latest bond offering. Normally this wouldn’t be worrisome as your assets and liabilities rise in tandem – or so you thought, until you find this gem they buried in the footnotes of their 10-K:

“…content assets, both licensed and produced, are reviewed in aggregate at the operating segment level when an event or change in circumstances indicates a change in the expected usefulness of the content or that the net realizable value or fair value may be less than amortized cost. To date, the Company has not identified any such event or changes in circumstances. If such changes are identified in the future, these aggregated content assets will be stated at the lower of unamortized cost, net realizable value or fair value. In addition, unamortized costs for assets that have been, or are expected to be, abandoned are written off.”

Ah, yes – there’s always the risk that all of those content assets acquired in the off-balance sheet transactions may not really be worth the acquisition cost, in which case there will be sizable charge-offs that will directly impair their free cash flow (which is already running huge losses as they follow the Amazon business model). As the company continues to grow its customer base, it will need to go to market and increase the size of their content acquisitions, which will inevitably lead to a few charge-offs as their content portfolio expands. This isn’t really an issue from a microeconomic standpoint. It has the ability to become a macroeconomic issue though, if content providers decide they want a bigger slice of the Netflix pie and start jacking up rates for licensing, even as Netflix begins to experience some standalone charge-offs. Any rate increases will continue to hit Netflix right in their cash flow statement. This is the point at which they’d need to pass those costs onto consumers, but who is to say they’ll continue to pay up? Netflix has the benefit of being structured like a low-cost gym membership, where customers forget about (or don’t mind) the cheap, recurring charge hitting their account each month. Were those costs to rise, customers may be a little more sensitive as to what they really gain from their membership, and whether or not it’s worth it.

I’m not saying any of this poses a going concern risk for Netflix, either. I do, however, think it does pose downside risk for equity investors, especially if you’re buying at these levels. Institutional investors are well aware of the off-balance sheet transactions and their cash impact, they just haven’t cared because customer growth has acted as a buffer. If there are any hiccups in customer growth or worse, retention, then lookout below as content cost and cash flow profile move up the ladder of importance in valuing the company.

P.S. – If they knock The Irishman out of the park I will disavow everything I just wrote. Can’t lose with Scorsese directing that cast.

The Deutsche Bank Difference

“Bloomberg – Deutsche Bank Inadvertently Made a $35 Billion Payment in a Single Transaction

Look, it’s 5:00pm on a Thursday – I want to go home, open up a nice old world red. Something to get the pallet dancing while I watch some playoff hoops. Complex tannins, high acidity, but nothing too extravagant. A nice every day wine, a workhorse wine if you will – Produttori del Barbaresco, perhaps.

But all that is on hold until I stick it to John Cryan one more time. As soon as I saw this headline come across, I absolutely knew that this wasn’t a recent event, that they buried this thing and, now that Cryan is gone, somebody spilled the beans. Turns out, they did this before Easter and by my quick calcs that falls under our boy’s tenure. Some back office kid in Germany was tasked with wiring the variation margin that day to their clearinghouse, Eurex. That’s it, just send some money to a different account. A simple task for most, but when you’re DB, you manage to bungle the easiest of things.

Now, I don’t want to get on this lowly analyst too much. I understand fat fingers happen – that’s why there’s industry jargon for it. But when you’re wiring cash in excess of the bank’s entire market cap, I know for a fact that there are multiple channels that have to sign off on releasing a wire instruction that large (I started out in ops, don’t lie to me). So unless I’m missing something, at least two people decided to send $35B to their clearing house that day – and that, my friends, is what we call the Deutsche Bank difference.

P.S. – that wine link isn’t even an ad. That’s just, in my opinion, one of the better, reasonably priced, old world’s you can find. Do yourself a favor.

Christine Lagarde: Noted ZeroHedge Reader

“CNBC – Global debt is at historic highs and governments should start cutting levels now, the IMF says”

*Sigh*

So, there’s been a lot of debt chatter coming out of the IMF recently. Just yesterday, we had them offer their unsolicited analysis on how the U.S. debt/GDP ratio will be worse than, gasp, Italy’s by 2023.  Today, we have Christine Lagarde, former French finance minister and current head of the IMF, imploring governments around the world to reduce their debt loads now while the getting is good. Don’t get me wrong, if you have the ability to reduce your debt burden in a responsible manner, do it. That said, just telling people debt is too high and that it’s a risk shows either a misunderstanding of the global financial system or an unwillingness to actually explain to people how it works and why we’ve racked up $164T in obligations.

The IMF piece focuses mainly on public sector debt as that has increased the most in the last decade, but we should touch on private debt first. Private, non-financial debt accounts for most of the debt globally, about 63% of it. In the last decade of low rates, households have borrowed to purchase houses, and corporations to fund domestic operations while leaving cash overseas and away from the tax man. In the case of the former, a house is a huge asset that can appreciate in value, be sold or be collateralized. In the case of the latter, the newly raised cash shows as an asset on the balance sheet while the bond appears as a liability, largely canceling each other out minus some interest expense. To the extent the cash is used for capex, that too will appear as an asset on a balance sheet as new equipment, property, investments, etc. In the end, the macro impact of private borrowing is a relative wash (barring credit cards and other consumer lending products, those are poor financial choices).

Let’s jump into public debt though, because that seems to be what’s worrying the IMF the most. They claim that debt/GDP ratios for advanced economies have only been this high once before: WWII. This is very true, but also very misleading. It’s helpful to understand the role government debt plays in a modern, credit-based economy before losing our minds.

Modern economies all have a (i) Government, (ii) Central Bank and (iii) Banking System. There are slight nuances here and there (especially in the Eurozone), but their functionalities are generally the same. Since all three of my readers are here in the U.S., we’ll use our system as a proxy for all developed economies. The Federal Reserve is the arbiter of the dollar. It controls the base money supply, credit availability / expansion, the cost to borrow in dollars, etc. It does this through what is called Open Market Operations (“OMOs”). This means that when the Fed wants to increase the money supply, they create some dollars and use them to buy shorter dated U.S. Government bonds. This pumps dollars into the banking system and reduces short term interest rates with the intent of stimulating the economy, and vice versa when the Fed wants to do the opposite. In a nutshell, the Fed uses the credit of the U.S. Government to conduct monetary policy. It’s no coincidence people say the dollar is backed by the “full faith and credit of the U.S. Government”, it’s a fact. Because of this relationship between the dollar and U.S. Government bonds, the two are more or less accepted universally as collateral in financial transactions (this is true for most other developed nations as well). At this moment, there are trillions upon trillions of dollars worth of government bonds posted as collateral all around the world, reinforcing trust in counterparties to transactions and keeping the system humming along. So while governments would be doing right by their taxpaying citizens to reduce or eliminate fiscal imbalances, a global, coordinated effort to actually pay down outstanding debt would wreak havoc on the financial system as bonds posted for collateral would cease to exist. Not only would there be a need to source new collateral to conduct transactions, the need would be great enough the materially impact interest rates and dollar reserves around the world. There’d be funding shortages, leading to soaring overnight and repo rates. It would be a mess (not cataclysmic, but messy regardless).

What’s also grinding IMF gears is not just the amount of public debt/GDP, but the pace at which it has accelerated over the last decade or so. The concern is understandable, but also a bit misguided. Since the financial crisis, central banks in the developed world have pumped trillions of dollars of liquidity into the financial system through Quantitative Easing (“QE”). This is a monetary policy tool in addition to the standard OMOs we discussed up top, and is used when conventional methods of stimulating the economy aren’t sufficient. The main difference between OMOs and QE is that the latter is more broad in its bond purchases, targeting government agency (Fannie, Freddie, et al.) and longer dated bonds. During and after the crisis, governments around the world, in tandem with their central banks, undertook an effort to recapitalize the global banking system through QE. For example, the U.S. Government would issue bonds directly to banks, who would turn around and sell the bonds to The Fed. At the end of the process, the U.S. Government has more debt, the banks have newly created cash and The Fed owns the bonds. This is where a lot of the incremental debt came from – a decade long effort to recap and stimulate the global economy through QE is directly responsible for the sharp uptick in public sector borrowing.

And that’s not a necessarily a bad thing. The Fed is what’s considered a quasi-government entity, but for all intents and purposes, it functions as part of the U.S. Government. If you think about it along those lines, you have bond issuance showing up as a liability on the U.S. Government’s balance sheet, but as an asset on the Fed’s. What’s more, the U.S. Government is paying interest to The Fed on the bonds, and The Fed turns around and writes a check each year to the Treasury to return the proceeds (minus operating costs). Lastly, The Fed reserves the right to buy and sell those bonds to conduct OMOs in the future, but it can also hold the bonds through maturity if need be, at which point the U.S. Government will either pay the principal to The Fed who will give it back at year end, or simply refinance the bonds in an endless cycle: wash, rinse, repeat. So yes, governments have been borrowing hand over first since the crisis, but when you combine central bank participation alongside how much government debt is owned by public and private retirement vehicles, much of it is actually owed to ourselves.

And that’s my problem with pieces like these. They’re all show and no substance. People read this stuff with the IMF stamp on it and then think they’re making informed decisions on how to invest, vote or spend – but they’re not. The only way modern capitalism works is the expansion of credit, not the contraction of it. Take a lap, Lagarde.