I’m Back. Markets Are Not.

The bull market is dead, LONG LIVE THE BULL MARKET!

This fucking virus, man.

I’m not an epidemiologist or virologist, so I’m just going to focus on the market impact here. Cities around the world are effectively shutting down in an effort to contain COVID-19. Aside from the loss of life, these measures are also presenting real challenges to the short-to-medium term viability of the global economy. Credit is freezing up, equity investors are getting hosed and the real economy is suffering from reduced spending. So, what’s going on here?

The credit markets are shutting down, a la ’08-’09. Anyone that lived and/or worked through the GFC knows this all too well.

The first major problem is the commercial paper market. At a high level, this is where corporations come to finance their payroll, accounts payable and other short term costs. Essentially, a company will issue a short term note (usually for a few days but no longer than 9 months), issued at a discount to the par value of the note, in exchange for cash now. The notes are issued at a discount to par which then becomes the investors’ return upon repayment. Since we’re talking unsecured notes, the credit quality of the companies issuing commercial paper is relatively high quality. This is a very mature market that normally functions incredibly well.

Enter COVID-19. As citizens around the world hunker down to “flatten the curve” of new virus cases, the obvious concern for investors has become the implications of what it means to shut down the global economy and how that impacts the liquidity profile of companies. We should even be discussing whether certain companies will be able to operate as a going concern in the future. Worries about liquidity have forced the hand of commercial paper investors: if they’re not sure whether you’ll be generating enough free cash flow through ordinary operations to pay back the notes, then they’re also not sure they’ll lend you the money.

Were the entire market to seize up like it did in the GFC, the effects on both the real and financial economy would be devastating. You’ll see companies struggle to make payroll and pay their bills, which will lead to lay offs and plummeting share prices as equity investors try to assess what it all means for profitability.

The second major problem we have on the funding side is the repo market. This is where banks and financial institutions come for short term financing (similarly to the commercial paper market for companies). A borrower will sell high grade paper (usually government bonds or agency-backed paper) to investors, with a contractual agreement to repurchase the collateral from the investors at a slightly higher price in the future. The repo market is massive, trading anywhere between $2 trillion – $4 trillion EVERY. DAY.

There is an immense amount of friction within the repo markets at the moment. Banks see that a recession (possibly depression) is now inevitable, and there will absolutely be some corporate casualties. They’re becoming more and more skeptical of lending to each other and any market analyst worth their salt knows this is always the kiss of death. The Fed has implemented a handful of programs in excess of $2 trillion to keep the repo market open, but the impact of even those efforts has so far been, muted. If you need just one example of how exacerbated the issue has become, look no further than the mREIT space.

While most people are familiar with the equity REIT space (buying properties and profiting from rents and/or capital appreciation), mortgage REITs (or mREIT) are a bit more opaque. Their business model is to borrow in the repo market at 4-5x leverage in order to finance the acquisition of mortgage-backed securities or originate whole loans themselves. Here’s a one month look at what happens to a highly-leveraged repo participant’s share price when the market starts to freeze up:

That’s not great! The equity market is essentially looking at these companies and saying, “Yeah, we’re gonna wake up one morning and one of these guys won’t be able to open for business” (read: bankruptcy). If the repo market completely dries up, there will be another Bear / Lehman event. The banking business is entirely built upon borrowing short to lend long, so any material interruption in that business model will prove absolutely fatal for some of the more highly-leveraged financial institutions.

But here’s my number, so call me maybe

Equity markets are plummeting. Gold was rallying but then fell off a cliff. Bonds rally and sink every other day. Oil isn’t remotely putting up a fight. Even fucking bitcoin looks like shit. Everything is selling off. How can that be? Where are the safe havens? Oh, that’s right:

SELL IT ALL! The ultimate feedback loop. Markets spiral > PMs sell to cover margin calls > forced selling tanks markets further > PMs sell more to cover more calls.

The stock market has been on an 11 year tear. The economy has been on fire, juiced (perhaps irresponsibly) by the Trump tax cuts. Credit has been pretty loose in a post-GFC era. It’s not difficult to imagine why portfolio managers around the world borrowed money to buy stocks and, to be fair, I don’t think you can ask a PM to hedge for pandemic-related exposures, either. After all, they don’t make a derivative for that (paging all structured products desks).

That said, none of that matters in this moment. The leverage in the system has exacerbated the equity sell off we’re seeing now, and it’s impact is going to be felt not just by fund managers, but by anyone with a 401-k, IRA or brokerage account. Those are real losses that are going to trickle up into the economy via reduction in consumer discretionary spending.

C.R.E.A.M.

The dollar is absolutely ripping, no surprise. There are a few reasons for this outside of the traditional safe haven trade.

The first is that since the U.S. capital markets are so dominant in the global economy, international investors have a lot of U.S. exposure. Typically, they’ll hedge their FX risk by selling USD and buying their local currency in their portfolios. The problem is that when U.S. markets start collapsing or fund managers begin selling, they’re left with hedges that are notionally too large for their overall U.S. equity exposure. This leads the international fund managers to scramble for the dollars needed to pare down their USD shorts in their portfolios.

The other reason, which hasn’t been in the headlines yet, will end up being the Eurodollar market. A Eurodollar is essentially a USD-denominated bank deposit that lives outside the U.S. financial system. The purpose of this market is avoiding U.S. capital requirements. In a Eurodollar transaction, an international bank will issue a short term deposit instrument to investors that will be denominated in USD. The deposits immediately become a USD-denominated liability on the bank’s balance sheet. This is all well and good in prosperous times. However, the rapid ascent in the value of onshore dollars during a crisis has a devastatingly deflationary effect on the international bank’s USD-denominated liabilities. Every time the USD increases in value, it costs more money for the international bank to repay the deposit instrument (their liability). This will likely force the international banks to go to market and purchase dollars as quickly as possible to avoid any more losses, akin to a short squeeze:

Combine the traditional safe haven trade, a general unwind of FX hedges and a Eurodollar squeeze, and you’ve got the recipe for a global dollar funding shortage – better known as a good ol’ fashioned liquidity crisis.

Where do we go from here?

The pain is likely to just be getting started. As quarantines become more prevalent, so will their impact in the economy. Institutions will continue to have difficulty funding their operations and share prices will continue to fall. Aside from markets imploding, however, there will be real human costs to this crisis.

There are thousands of restaurants and bars across the country (and millions across the world) that will never open again. Those people will lose everything and so will their employees. The supply chain is going to become increasingly strained as borders shut, likely inducing shortages of some goods. People are going to lose their savings, and that will take an indescribable toll on some.

Who knows what the next 12-18 months holds in store for everyone. All I know is that it’s getting weird out there and I’m not sure I have enough wine stockpiled. All we can do is sit back, go cash and enjoy the show.

Waiting for the coming recession is going to be like ordering an UberX: you know it’s going to be a terrible ride, but you won’t really know just how bad until that black Camry with seat protectors pulls up.

Shoot First, Ask Questions Later: Upstream Edition (Update)

“Reuters – WTI Midland spread traded as weak as a $15 per barrel discount to crude futures on Thursday morning.”

“Reuters – Next-day natural gas prices for Thursday at the Waha hub in the Permian basin tumbled 60 percent to their lowest on record due to pipeline constraints limiting the amount of gas that can move out of the region.”

First things first: the blog has been eerily quiet for the last two and a half months. Yeah well, I was a little busy with work and enjoying my summer – sue me. I don’t think I missed any big stories other than Elon Musk trying his best to destroy TSLA’s stock price or every bitcoin speculator piling their money into weed stocks – but in any event the blogging engines are fired up and as a first order of business I’d like to touch on something very dear to me: energy markets.

I wrote a blog in late June discussing the lack of midstream assets / capacity in the Permian and what impact that would have on regional WTI and nat gas spreads. You’ll recall that Scott Sheffield, CEO of Pioneer, predicted that WTI Midland would trade at a discount of $25/bbl within the next quarter. Well here we are three months later and the discount is ~$15/bbl – not quite $25 but still a sizable Midland / Cushing spread. On top of that, Permian natural gas is trading at an all time low of $0.66/mmBtu compared to Henry Hub product which currently sits at $2.98/mmBtu. This is bad news for Permian producers. The worse news, though? It’s about to get worse as refineries enter maintenance season this fall / winter. As refineries shut in for scheduled maintenance, the demand for crude will drop in lockstep. With even less demand for crude in the markets, Permian producers will be forced to reduce prices even further, eroding already delicate cash flow profiles.

It’s likely that some producers will have to shut in production and move rigs away to save cash for the spring and summer months. You may even see some consolidation among smaller independents and private equity drillcos – although many of these players may be too indebted to make a transaction like that pass muster with their boards / investment committees in this environment. Whatever does happen, it will be interesting to see how it plays out. One thing’s for certain: the E&P space is no stranger to booms and busts, good times and bad. The industry always makes it through, it’s just a matter of what players are left to fight in the next round.

Trade War with China? Sign Me Up.

I’ve been hearing a lot of chirping around these parts about a trade war with China.

Talking heads across the political and economic sphere have voiced grave concerns about the Trump administration’s foray into hardline trade negotiations with China. Conventional wisdom is that China has entrenched its neo-mercantilist economic model so deeply into the globalized economy that any challenge to their long-standing goal of economic supremacy will prove to be damaging and, possibly fatal. With that, to the detractors I say, “Take a long walk off a short pier.”

Now, before I explain why that’s not the case, I have to point out how terribly embarrassing it is to have so-called experts espousing such a fatalistic view toward America’s economic future and our ability to determine it ourselves.

“Welp, there’s nothing we can do to stop them so we may as well play nice and hope for the best.”

Anyway – In order to understand why a trade confrontation with China is long overdue, it’s important to have at least a high level understanding of how American companies have to operate within Chinese borders. It’s no secret that the Chinese market, through its expanding middle class, is a key growth engine for American companies. That said, operating and/or selling in China often comes with high entry fees such as handing over trade secrets and intellectual property to the government, forcing American companies into JVs with other state-owned enterprises and already high tariffs. As the communist government has tight controls over the mainland economy, the trade secrets and IP are almost always handed over to local Chinese companies in order to leverage their depressingly low labor costs to replicate (steal) American products and compete with American firms in the global market. In other words, American companies are collecting large upfront payments via initial sales, but giving away future profit and market share to their Chinese competitors (and government).

So, what is America to do here? Furthermore, how is China supposed to respond? Most importantly, who comes out on top? Well, let’s take a look at the tools each side has at their disposal in an increasingly ugly trade spat and see why America will inevitably come out on top.

Tariffs v1: The Trump administration campaigned on imposing tariffs on Chinese-made goods and they sure did deliver. As word spread Trump was serious about the taxes, the Chinese government compiled a list of their own which was released almost immediately after Trump’s were announced. It appears as if that round was a wash, but in reality we can chalk this up as a victory for America. While past administrations have spoken about getting tougher on China, rarely has anything ever been done on this scale. This shot across the bow brought China to the negotiating table and, while the first round of talks fell apart, the U.S. got what it wanted in opening up a dialogue regarding the restructuring of U.S. – China trade relations.

Tariffs v2: The original tariffs that Trump imposed largely targeted raw materials, which China then mirrored in its response. This was an attempt to protect consumers from the direct impact of tariffs and lay the burden on companies. While there would obviously be marginally higher prices for consumers in order to compensate for higher production costs, they likely wouldn’t move the needle enough to have a material impact on wallets. Round two of tariffs have moved from raw materials to finished goods: a battle China can’t win and doesn’t want to fight. This means that the U.S. consumer has finally been dragged into this kerfuffle and will now be paying noticeably more for many finished goods imported from China. The problem for China is they need us to import more than we need them to export. I mentioned in the second paragraph that China is practicing neo-mercantilism. They’ve built their entire economic model off utilizing tight capital and currency controls, low labor costs and raw materials to encourage exports and discourage imports, with the hope of becoming the world’s indispensible manufacturing hub. We’ve always been China’s best customer in this model (we still are and likely will be going forward). We don’t have to be, though. Labor conditions in the U.S. have never been tighter and the Trump administration has been looking for ways to rebuild our manufacturing base while providing high-paying jobs. If the severity of tariffs or length of time in force were to increase, it’s likely that companies manufacturing abroad and importing to America would slowly begin to onshore production here. Not only would that avoid tariffs, but it would likely improve supply chain economics by consolidating operations locally and reducing transportation costs in a post-globalization world (which is where we seem to be headed). In fact, you’ve already seen this with Foxconn’s $10B capital investment in Wisconsin to build a LCD screen manufacturing plant. My point here is we aren’t really as reliant on China for manufacturing purposes as people think, and as the tariffs will be targeted on specific goods and not broadly implemented, I’m confident America has the work force, technology and guts to onshore any lost Chinese capacity and produce those specific goods here.

Currency Controls: A key component of any mercantilist economy is the aggregation of foreign currency reserves in order to help the local government more tightly control the value of its own currency. The idea is that U.S. dollars flow into China in exchange for goods and those foreign reserves are then actively bought and sold by China in order to keep its currency at a value it believes is optimal for driving exports. There has been chatter that instead of retaliating to Trump’s second round of tariffs with tariffs of their own, China may simply begin selling RMB and buying USD in order to make it cheaper for Americans to import Chinese-made goods, thus circumventing the impact of Trump’s tariffs and keeping trade humming along. This is actually a relatively effective strategy for China both from an economic and geopolitical standpoint. Economically it suffers very little and geopolitically China comes out looking like the adult in the room by not escalating the tariff fiasco, even though they’re doing it stealthily. The problem is that this mechanism’s effectiveness is likely capped as China is a member of the WTO. The Trump administration, since day one, has railed against China, calling them a “currency manipulator” and accusing the government of keeping the RMB artificially low in order to drive exports to America – even though at the time of Trump’s inauguration the RMB was relatively strong historically speaking. It didn’t make sense at the time, but one has to wonder if they were setting the stage for a trade war they knew they’d eventually launch and were using bluster to pre-emptively target and draw attention to one of China’s most effective weapons. Any prolonged, material weakness in the RMB through government intervention would likely result in cases brought in front of the WTO, which the U.S. has quite the track record of winning.

Raw Materials: This is an area where China has our number as it stands now. Chinese companies have, quite presciently, amassed large positions in raw materials all around the globe – especially in the rare earths space, which is absolutely critical to technology production. If push came to shove, China could inflict quite a bit of damage on the U.S. by restricting or outright banning the sale of some raw materials into the U.S. or to U.S. companies. Again, we don’t have to be so reliant on China for supply of raw materials. According to the USGS, the U.S. alone boasts a $6.2T supply of minerals and rare earths – so our problem is largely self-inflicted: regulatory burden. The permitting process to excavate a new mine in the U.S. is a grueling, years-long undertaking that many mining firms aren’t willing to endure (with good reason – if there isn’t a need to mine and pollute our ecosystem we should refrain from doing it). Things are changing, however, as Trump signed an executive order last December to increase critical minerals production domestically in order to end America’s “vulnerability” to China. Despite this, I will give this round to China as they would be able to turn off the spigot relatively quickly, leaving the U.S. scrambling to source enough materials to meet production needs. In the long run, though, America has the flexibility domestically and relationships abroad to diversify our mineral supply chain – and we should.

Capitalism / Open Economy: This one isn’t even close. Despite China’s ascendance on the global stage, the U.S. has built the deepest, most dynamic economy the world has ever known. The ability for individuals to raise capital, innovate and cash out has given the U.S. one major, distinct advantage over China: human capital. People flock to America to learn at our universities, work for our companies, invest and, frankly, to have a better life. The same can’t be said for mainland China, or many other places in the world, either. This is our ace in the hole. This is what glues all of my other arguments together. The Chinese have built a powerful economy through brute force and coercion, not opportunity and profit. Were a trade war to actually break out in a prolonged fashion, the U.S. economy would handily outlast the Chinese as our system would likely adapt to new opportunities, whereas the Chinese government would need to devise and implement a new strategy through bureaucracy and decree. Toss this one to the U.S.

That’s that. The United States has been far too complacent for far too long when it comes to trade. We’ve always been proponents of free trade and open markets and we always will be – but we can no longer turn a blind eye to the hollowing out of our finances by third parties at the expense of our citizens. This isn’t about reckless nationalism. It’s not about blowing up the global economy. It’s about math – that’s all.

 

Leveraged Burnout: Welcome

After years of staring into the anachronous (yet oddly satisfying) abyss that is a Bloomberg terminal, “v-ing up the model” and sifting through more management presentations than Intralinks, I’ve decided my brain can use a good ol’ fashioned creative reboot. Enter: Leveraged Burnout; my own satirical takes on an industry that, while I hold it dearly to my heart, has almost completed its transformation into a parody of itself – financial services.

Truth is, I wouldn’t have to do this if Dealbreaker would get their heads out of their asses and put out some quality content. That said, as noted extortion victim and all around good guy Rick Pitino once said: “Bess Levin and Matt Levine are not walkin’ through that door.” So we’ll do it. Together. While covering topics that truly matter, like if 2018 is finally the year that Deutsche Bank or Bill Ackman remember how to turn a profit.

I’m not sure how this whole thing will play out (nor will I care until it generates some ad rev), but we’ll see what happens. Maybe it grows and some more writers come aboard, maybe I’m not actually funny or knowledgeable enough to keep an audience. All I know is, I’m excited.

P.S. – speaking of Deutsche Bank, it looks like one of the longest running memes on the internet found out it was long some Tesla paper.

’til next time.