U.S. Government Makes Uncharacteristically Great Decision, Spends Decade Trying to Undo It

Bloomberg – Too Big to Fix: Fannie and Freddie Are Still a Mess

I never pass up an article about mortgage markets, so once I saw Bloomberg offering their opinion on why Fannie and Freddie are “still a mess” ten years into conservatorship, I was in from the jump.

Outside of the economic and reputational damage it caused, I’m a big fan of the Financial Crisis, even the fact that we call it “The Financial Crisis” – like there never was or never will be another one. I’m a big finance guy and even bigger policy wonk, so the storylines that emerged out of that period are right up my alley. Most have played out in full and been relegated to the dustbin of history, becoming more folklore nowadays than relevant discussions. There is one that remains, though: the re-privatization of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

Fannie and Freddie are known as Government-sponsored Enterprises (GSEs). They’re private companies that were basically granted monopoly status by the U.S. government in order to keep the mortgage markets functioning smoothly and encourage home ownership. They each have lines of credit with the Treasury Department, are exempt from state and local taxes and, despite being publicly-traded, they’re not regulated by the SEC. Their business models consist of buying private label mortgages, securitizing them and then guaranteeing the mortgages to ensure that interest and principal payments are made on the subsequent mortgage bonds.

The two companies got into a whole heap of trouble in 2008 when the subprime market began to implode and those guarantees became problematic. Long story short: the feds stepped in and the two companies were taken over by the government. In return for the bail out, the Treasury received $1B in preferred stock with a 10% coupon from each entity, as well as warrants for 79.9% of each of their the common stock.

The idea at the time was to bail these two private companies out, stabilize the mortgage markets and then return them back to shareholders at a profit for the taxpayers a la the AIG bailout. However, ten years into the bailout and the government is not one step closer to figuring out what the future will look like for the companies. The problem is two-fold here and, surprisingly, has nothing to do with partisan politics. The first issue is that the two entities are so massive, so integral to the U.S. economy, that any sweeping changes would require years of heavy lifting and, with the stakes so high, nobody has tried in earnest to restructure the companies and return them to private investors. The second issue is that well, the current structure is… working? We’re ten years into this relationship and so far, so good. The mortgage markets are running as smoothly as ever, Fannie and Freddie have returned to profitability and the Treasury is clipping a 10% coupon on its preferred interests. Not to mention, the Treasury mandated that any profit Fannie or Freddie generate be remitted to taxpayers in the form of dividend distributions as well. If you need a summary: the bail out worked and the taxpayers are making a killing. Status quo is always good for governments and this situation is no different – if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.

Unsurprisingly, not everyone feels that way. Some big name funds like Paulson & Co. and Fairholme have taken large stakes in the companies’ remaining public equity and have preached, quite loudly, that the companies should be returned to private investors and that they’d be able to were the Treasury not siphoning their profits each quarter. On the other hand, you have some politicians that believe the mortgage markets should be a private capital game or that the current situation is an unsustainable band-aid fix.

To these parties I ask: why? For what reason is the current situation unsustainable? Why is it imperative that Fannie and Freddie regain their status as private companies? Forget the fact that Fannie and Freddie were never truly private – any company with tax exempt status and a revolver with the Treasury is far from private. The fact is that homeowners are able to take out reasonably priced mortgages from private companies, bond investors are getting their low risk yield and the taxpayers are making money. The system works! “But it’s a band-aid fix! It was never meant to be this way!” True, very true. You know what else is true though? Every day the government doesn’t do anything to amend the current structure is a day the band-aid fix becomes a little more permanent. Slowly and slowly, as new and old elected officials move in and out of Washington, each Congress becomes a little more detached from the whole thing and will elect to do nothing – as long as everything is functioning as it should.

If you take a step back and actually look at how the system is working now, it seems like this is how it was always supposed to be. Private companies are investing in the mortgage market, consumers are buying homes, taxpayers are generating a profit and the government has a policy tool in Fannie and Freddie. Don’t get me wrong, that was not by design. It was a happy accident that the feds stepped in for a decade and have been successfully running the largest financial services companies on the planet. Let’s not screw this up.

 

 

Fortress Doesn’t Believe in (Possibly Care About) Conflict Checks

“NY Post – SoftBank’s Fortress Investment Group is raising a $400 million fund to sue tech companies over intellectual property infringement…”

Before we get started, I know that Mike Novogratz left his life’s work years ago, but who else am I going to put up there to represent Fortress?

Now, I have to admit I was ready to poke some fun at SoftBank for this one. How can a conglomerate, with telecom, semiconductor and robotics interests allow one of its portfolio companies to be an outright patent troll? How can SoftBank, who has $195B in committed capital for it’s tech-focused investment vehicles, allow Fortress (“FIG”) to shakedown the very companies in which they seek to invest? Well after a while, it hit me: whether purposeful or not, this is probably a great way to hedge a tech-centric private equity portfolio. Outside of proper due diligence, managing FX / rates exposure or structuring capital calls to meet specific milestones, there aren’t many ways to manage the downside risk of making poor investments in the first place – especially when deploying capital into intellectual property-heavy tech industry.

Odds are, you’re investing in a tech company because it claims to have a new technology that can streamline business processes, enhance end-user experiences or is simply a brand new class of product. With new technology comes the prospect of a high adoption rate and, of course, multiples of invested capital. It’s not all glitz and glamour though, and there are real risks to investing in the tech space, more so perhaps than any other industry. The costliest mistake you can make in tech investing is, by a wide margin, not conducting the proper diligence around a target’s intellectual property / patent portfolio. Does the company really own this IP? Are they infringing on someone else’s IP? Who’s line of code is this, truly? Are there any outstanding lawsuits? What about imminent filings? Tons of these lawsuits are filed every day around the world by what are known as “patent trolls” – individuals or funds that buy random portfolios of IP and lawyer up to shakedown other tech companies for infringement. Rarely do the lawsuits reach a decision as they’re usually settled outside of court, which is exactly what the patent troll wanted. It’s a pretty scummy industry, but it’s also pretty lucrative – which is why FIG wants a piece of it. If a respected NYC asset manager raises $400M with the intention of suing nerdy Silicon Valley idealists into oblivion, the nerds will pay up to settle. Cash burn is fine when it serves whatever “mission” the unicorn de jour says it has, not when it’s being wasted on lawyers.

That brings us to the impact of this new FIG vehicle on its parent, SoftBank. Taken at face value, it seems like FIG is raising two birds toward everything SoftBank has built it’s reputation on – investing in and building out new technologies. If you take a forest vs. tree view, though, a successful patent troll investment platform can hedge against IP-related losses SoftBank portfolio companies may incur. Obviously a $400M investment is an irrelevant hedge for a $195B portfolio, but it’s a start. It’s not unthinkable that were this initial foray to be successful, that FIG would double or triple down to target more or larger targets. I also wouldn’t discount the idea of SoftBank seeding a larger IP strategy within FIG were they to succeed with this initial vehicle – that would be something special. This will be an interesting story to follow in the next few years and, no matter what happens, it’ll be a great exercise in thinking outside of the risk management box for SoftBank.

CEO Invests in Local Bodegas (Plus Blog Update)

First things first: I’ve taken a bit of a hiatus recently and haven’t posted anything for the last six days. I’ve been pretty busy with work, not to mention the IT nerds at my firm decided to block my own domain. I’m working with them now to get it sorted out but, until then, we’ll be doing limited posts from my phone or during the evening.

Now that we have that out of the way, lets take a second to bask in the glory that is Kam Wong, CEO of Municipal Credit Union (MCU), who has no grasp on how to commit bank fraud or what to do with the ill-gotten gains:

“CNBC – The CEO of New York state’s oldest credit union swindled his institution for years out of millions of dollars and blew a whopping $3.55 million on lottery tickets, federal prosecutors charged Tuesday.

There are two main takeaways from this story. The first is that Kam Wong is either a woefully inept CEO, or he’s a woefully inept criminal – and I’m going with both here. Forget that he embezzled over $6M from his own company, the way he pulled it off is next level stupid. The guy was running your standard insurance fraud racket in order to collect cash on $6M worth of bogus dental and long term disability claims. So what did he do when he had the money – well, withdraw $1.9M from ATMs via 2,592 transactions and write over 200 checks to a bodega in Elmont, NY. You would think a banking CEO would be able to cook up a better way to embezzle and launder money than that.

The second takeaway and obviously the most important, is that Kam blew almost $4M of the money on…

Lotto tickets. You remember those bodega checks he was writing? Yeah, he wrote all of them to the bodega in order to feed his insatiable scratch off habit. Here’s The Post:

“In a weird twist, about $3.9 million of the ill-gotten gains allegedly went to fund a “lottery habit” near his office and his home in Valley Stream, Long Island.

Wong, who made more than $684,000 a year, wrote 216 checks to two bodegas and withdrew $1.9 million from ATMs a total of 2,592 times for the lottery tickets — sometimes multiple times a day, according to the complaint.

On weekends, Wong “spent hours … purchasing and playing lottery tickets,” according to the Justice Department complaint filed by Manhattan US attorney Geoffrey S.”

What a weird guy! I just can’t wrap my brain around buying $4M worth of lotto tickets. Did he play 200,000 twenty dollar games or 4,000,000 one dollar games? How much did he actually win on them? How upset is the bodega owner who just lost his $4M scratch off customer? Why did a CEO clearing almost $700K a year live in Valley Stream and hang out in Elmont? I doubt we’ll ever know the answers, but if you think I’ll ever stop searching for them, you’re probably right. I’ll definitely enjoy myself a nice chuckle when I see a headline buried in the “Local” section of the NY papers when he gets sentenced. That’s it, though.

But seriously, thoughts and prayers to the bodega. They’ll need to sling a whole lot of these bad boys to make up for the Kam Wong revenue shortfall going forward:

I Say We Bail Out the Hedge Funds, Too

“Bloomberg – At Milken, Hedge Fund Managers Swap Ideas on Staying in Business”

Won’t somebody please think of the fund managers!

I wanted to write a blog about how out of touch this group of millionaires is that they felt it necessary to take to a public forum to complain about how difficult it is for them to make money. Because when you’re blaming your own investors, stating their risk aversion has “sowed the seeds of very mediocre returns and high fees”, you’re not doing yourself any favors.

The truth is, though, they’re partially right. Now before we get into it, it’s important to understand that while the average American probably views fund managers as overpaid leaches, sucking economic value from the public system for their own private gain, they serve an important role in a modern economy. Traditionally, fund managers have offered three key benefits to investors and the market as a whole: (i) they assist institutional investors such as pension funds and insurance companies diversify their portfolios across different sectors and strategies, creating a more predictable return profile to match their long-term liabilities, (ii) they offer other sophisticated investors the opportunity to invest in more illiquid strategies like real estate, commodities and derivatives, and (iii) they provide liquidity to the broader market and enhance price discovery. Historically speaking, hedge funds have been pretty good at generating benchmark-beating, uncorrelated, risk-adjusted returns, and they collected fat fees for doing so. After all, investors were generally beating their benchmarks, even after the funds collected their fees, so nobody cared. Times are different now, though, and that’s where the plight of the hedge fund comes into play.

The rise of passive/index investing has been pretty detrimental to the traditional hedge fund model for a number of reasons, however it’s not just the strategy itself, but the time in which it came to prominence which ended up being the perfect storm for hedge funds. According to EY, the ETF market increased from $700B under management in 2008 to over $4.5T at the end of 2017 – for the people at home, that’s an increase of 543%. What’s more, 2017 alone saw inflows of $464B into passive vehicles. The explosion in passive products and their AUM has either democratized or socialized the markets, depending on who you ask. Either way, they have given all investors the ability to target as broad or narrow an investment strategy as they like, from simply buying the S&P 500 or small cap energy stocks, to shorting the VIX and beyond. As more and more money flows into these products, the asset managers need to go out and buy more stocks to replicate the underlying indices, therefore inflating individual stock prices in the process.

This is the problem for hedge funds. We’ve been on an almost ten year tear after bottoming out in the financial crisis, with the S&P 500 up +259% over that period. When you combine such strong, broad market performance with the explosion in passive capital basically bidding up individual stocks on a daily basis, it is nearly impossible for traditional fund managers to generate any alpha – and ladies and gentleman, if there’s no alpha, there’s no fees to collect for the fund managers. As a result, you’ve seen many large investors wonder out loud why they’re paying fees to managers who can’t beat the market, which has led to an all-out exodus from the hedge fund model. Even behemoth pension funds such as CalPERS are ditching managers for the passive life. Doing away with fund managers in the name of saving money on fees may prove to be penny wise and pound foolish though, as any deep correction in the market would likely be amplified by the fact that so many investors have plowed money into these products. At the end of the day, these guys are called hedge funds. They aim to provide appropriate risk-adjusted (i.e., hedged) returns. If you’re just super long energy stocks through an ETF and there’s another 2015-2016 episode, you’ll wish you had paid some fees and been hedged through an experienced energy fund manager who would’ve had proper risk management systems in place to mitigate downside risk.

Regardless, at this moment the hedge fund model is broken and if they want to survive, they’ll need to adapt. I saw an interesting piece in Bloomberg the other day that encouraged managers to ditch 2/20 and actually pay all their LPs a guaranteed fixed rate over the benchmark returns to manage their assets. Anything generated over that fixed rate would remain with the fund manager. The investors would generate a guaranteed return, similar to a fixed income product, and the manager would retain any alpha generated. It’s an interesting idea, but not likely. It’s good to at least see people thinking outside of the box.

Here’s The Mooch Getting Spiritual After Missing Out on $100M Payday

Let me start out by saying my firm has blocked Leveraged Burnout on our network, so I’m blogging from my phone. Apologies if there are typos, rambling sentences or any weird formatting issues.

“Bloomberg – HNA Group Co. and SkyBridge Capital have agreed to drop the Chinese conglomerate’s plan to acquire the investment firm.

Anthony Scaramucci: everyone’s favorite hedge fund giant and real life short guy. There was a time when The Mooch had it all. After a bunch of fundraising for then-presidential candidate Trump, he was finally offered the position of White House Director of Communications after the Sean Spicer experiment.  As is normal for cabinet members, he began to divest of assets that could conflict with his duties as a cabinet member, in this case, his stake in the well known fund-of-funds he built, SkyBridge Capital (actually a solid shop, did business with them at one point). The deal was valued at $180M, which would net Scaramucci about $100M at closing.

Anyway, he oddly chose to sell the firm to HNA, a giant Chinese conglomerate, and subject the transaction to CFIUS (which is a council that decides to approve or deny material foreign investments into U.S. companies). This was pretty dumb because after all the Trump-China campaign rhetoric, The Mooch decided to sell out to the Chinese tax free in front of the whole world. Predictably, the whole thing became a drawn out mess because of how high profile the sale was. It also didn’t help that he told a reporter what he really thinks about Steve Bannon and Reince Priebus, leading to him being unceremoniously (but hilariously) fired after 10 days in office.

Welp, that all leads us to yesterday’s developments, where SkyBridge and HNA decided the CFIUS process was too laborious and expensive and moved to kill the deal. So now The Mooch is out $100M and will be returning to the firm he built, which I suppose isn’t the worst thing. Maybe he’ll do the right thing and give Gary Cohn a job, too.

P.S. – Tell me this guy’s tenure at the White House didn’t play out exactly like you thought it would.